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The light began flooding the or-
nately baroque corridors of the Pal-
ais Coburg hotel in Vienna’s Old 
City district as the sun rose on the 
morning of July 14, 2015. Diplomat-
ic aides hurriedly rushed around the 
VIP suites and ceremonious meeting 
rooms of the hotel as the ministers of 
foreign affairs from the delegations 
of six major world powers and the 
Islamic Republic of Iran gathered to 
seal an arduous twenty-month pro-
cess of negotiation, setbacks, and po-
litical and personal sacrifice with their 
signatures on what former President 
Obama has since touted as a “his-
toric” deal for the West’s relationship 
with Iran and its highly controversial 
nuclear program.1
The deal itself stipulates little that, 
outside the context of the strained 
relationship between Iran and the 
United States, might calling it a land-
mark deal. Mostly middle-of-the-
road terms that reflect the amount of 
diplomatic work that went into the 
accords, like putting Iran’s nuclear re-
search on hold for ten years and the 
lifting of economic sanctions on Iran’s 
energy and financial industries, failed 
to convince many of former Presi-
dent Obama’s domestic and foreign 
opponents of the deal’s importance 
in addressing a nuclear Iran.2 On the 
contrary, politicians like Arkansas 
Senator Tom Cotton and Israeli Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have 
taken a diametrically opposite inter-
pretation of the deal, going so far as to 
call it a “terrible, dangerous mistake” 
and “historically bad.”3 4 The current 
presidential administration has re-
peatedly characterized the nuclear ac-
cords as not “much of an agreement,” 
repeatedly accusing the Islamic Re-
public of violating the deal’s terms.5 
Moreover, vociferous opposition to 
the accords that began even before its 
terms were settled and became public 
in mid-July 2015 implies that there is 
an element separate from its content 
that animates political discussion of 
the issue of the Iran deal and relations 
with Iran in general.
It’s hard to deny that the histor-
ically intense distrust between the 
United States and Iran helps motivate 
some of the anti-deal sentiment in 
each country. It’s also, however, this 
same shared history of suspicion that 
may hold some of the most import-
ant insights about the deal itself. The 
context for this understanding is the 
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thread of Iranian-Western relations 
through the ages of colonialism and 
decolonization, the Islamic Revolu-
tion, and the formation of the current 
regime in Iran. A further layer of com-
plexity in looking at the nuclear negoti-
ations is added with the consideration 
of the contemporary social and politi-
cal atmosphere in the Iranian domestic 
sphere. Much of the opposition to the 
accords in the United States has belied 
and even ignored the complicated na-
ture of Iran’s interactions with the rest 
of the world, as well as the specifics of 
the deal itself. This often-overlooked 
background speaks of a situation far 
more complex than what many who 
oppose the accords seem to entertain 
and that must be taken into account if 
the United States and the West want to 
see long-term diplomatic success with 
Iran.
***
Although Iran maintained contact 
with Europe under the late-Renais-
sance rule of Shah Abbas I, widespread 
Iranian contact with the West in the 
modern era didn’t begin in full force 
until the demise of the Safavid Dynasty 
in the mid-eighteenth century.6 A se-
ries of weak and fragmented dynasties 
lasting almost a century led to territori-
al and trade encroachment from both 
the Ottomans and Western agents like 
Russia and the Dutch and British East 
India Companies.7 The typical model 
of European colonization generally be-
gins with colonizers creating selective 
economic inroads, followed by gradual 
expansion of influence, to an eventu-
ally complete political and economic 
subjugation of the colonized country. 
Had it not been for the presence either 
of an adamant Russo-British rivalry 
in the Persian region or the resource 
curse of enormous oil reserves, Iran’s 
historical development would doubt-
less have followed the pattern of oth-
er colonized countries in its region. 
Tensions between Britain and Russia 
were initially based on geographic im-
portance for the Russian Caucasus and 
Russian-dominated Central Asia and 
British interests in the Persian Gulf and 
British-controlled India. Nevertheless, 
the rivalry ensured that neither coun-
try could establish official territorial 
control over the Persian monarchy’s 
domain.
While Persia’s de jure independence 
was preserved continuously through 
the colonial era and into the era of de-
colonization, it was of little comfort to 
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the Iranian people. As the demand for 
oil blossomed with Western modern-
ization, so did demand for access to 
Iran’s oilfields. British commercial in-
terests conducted predatory and ineq-
uitable business transactions with the 
native monarchy, among the most in-
famous of which was the 1872 Reuter 
concession. The deal, which the British 
viceroy of India himself memorably 
called “the most complete surrender 
of the entire resources of a kingdom 
into foreign hands that has ever been 
dreamed of, much less accomplished, 
in history,” gave the British Baron de 
Reuter exclusive rights to mine for 
most minerals and sole authority to 
construct roads and railroads through-
out the country.8 Even worse for Iran, 
the railroads Reuter was to 
build weren’t constructed un-
til after World War I, leaving 
Iranian infrastructure woe-
fully underdeveloped.9 The 
domestic backlash — and the 
tsarist opposition — against 
this historically bad deal was 
enough that the Persian gov-
ernment cancelled it a few 
years later, although though 
the British embassy in Tehran 
subsequently forced the Persian gov-
ernment to renegotiate a marginally 
less draconian agreement with Reu-
ter.10
Both world wars led to the full in-
carnation of British and Russian pow-
er in Iran, in the form of military oc-
cupation of Iranian territory. The two 
powers, who had temporarily settled 
their differences to become allies in 
both World War I and II, had a vest-
ed interest in protecting Iran’s oilfields 
from the reach of Imperial and Nazi 
Germany. Since an Anglo-Russian rap-
prochement in 1907, Britain and Rus-
sia had divided Iran into two respective 
spheres of influence, where each could 
exploit oil and mineral resources, and a 
third “neutral” region between the two 
that was “tacitly recognized as being 
open to British interests.”11 The An-
glo-Russian agreement had crushed 
the democratic dreams of a nascent 
Iranian constitutionalist movement, 
and effectively relegated Iran to a Brit-
ish protectorate after a temporary in-
terruption of Russian influence during 
the Russian Revolution.12 The large-
ly-bloodless coup that brought Brit-
ish-backed Reza Pahlavi to the throne 
in 1925 led to a modernizing, centraliz-
ing, and secularizing reign that eventu-
ally proved too independent for British 
tastes.13 14 Attempts to reduce British 
control of Iran’s oil reserves by choos-
ing to receive technical assistance from 
German and Italian instead of British 
engineers led to British and Allied un-
easiness toward the Shah’s Nazi sympa-
thies.15 The subsequent Anglo-Soviet 
invasion of Iran and overthrow of Reza 
Pahlavi for his more malleable son, 
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi in 1941 led 
to a crisis in 1946 that emphasized the 
continuing quasi-colonial exploitation 
of the country. The Soviet Union re-
fused for several months to evacuate its 
occupying troops from northern Iran, 
anxious to counter encroaching Brit-
ish and American oil interests in the 
technically neutral and independent 
country.
British and American interests 
in Iran’s politics received one of their 
strongest rebuffs to date in the 1951 
election of Mohammed Mossaddegh 
as Iranian prime minister. Atop the new 
prime minister’s policy agenda was a 
serious investigation and reform of the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company — the BP 
ancestor company founded on pred-
atory British concessions that a large 
number of Iranians saw as the primary 
arm of continuing “colonial arrogance” 
and interference in the country.16 Mos-
saddegh’s attempts at nationalizing the 
Iranian oil industry — or at least allow-
ing Iran more than the approximately 
11.7% of profits it was receiving under 
prior agreements—were met with in-
transigence on the part of the British 
company.17 The British appealed to 
the United States, claiming that 
Mossaddegh’s government was 
sympathetic to communism and 
the Soviets. In response, the CIA 
initiated a clandestine operation 
that ended in 1953 with Mossad-
degh’s overthrow and permanent 
house arrest — a role formally 
admitted only in 2011, but long 
realized by outraged Iranians.18
The U.S.-backed removal of 
the democratically-elected lead-
er of Iran had a profound impact on 
Iranians’ views of the United States. 
An Iranian woman, reflecting on Mos-
saddegh’s overthrow, remembered that 
the U.S. went from “the country that 
helped us while other countries were 
exploiting us” in Iranian public opin-
ion to one that “no one in Iran ever 
trusted…again.”19 Of no help to Amer-
icans’ public image in Iran was the 
subsequent reinstitution of the Shah 
as a monarch with even more powers 
than he had before and an increasing-
ly controversial and repressive regime 
in Tehran following the 1953 coup.20 
Moreover, the secular Shah’s land re-
forms aimed at ending the political 
Both world wars led to the full in-
carnation of British and Russian 
power in Iran, in the form of mili-
tary occupation...
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power of Iranian imams fostered an 
alliance between the religious right, led 
by the future Ayatollah Khomeini, and 
Mossaddegh’s secular leftist followers.21
The complicated stew of anti-im-
perialism, Islamism, nationalism, and 
anti-Western sentiment that came out 
of this prolonged history of foreign 
exploitation and humiliation was very 
rapidly brought to the surface of Ira-
nian society and politics in late 1977 
and early 1978, with mass protests and 
strikes against the Shah’s authoritarian 
government paralyzing Tehran.22 By 
January 1979, the Shah was forced to 
flee to Egypt, and by March a referen-
dum had been introduced on the ques-
tion of an Islamic republic. Although 
the question was put forth in a way 
so as to sideline secularists and more 
liberal Islamists, an overwhelming 99 
percent of Iranian referendum voters 
voted “yes” on Khomeini’s Islamist re-
gime.23 Although Iran’s rapid political 
transformation had a lasting effect on 
its relations with the West, it was only 
with the hostage crisis at the American 
embassy in Tehran that damaged rela-
tions were actually “shattered” and Iran 
“set…on the path of isolation.”24 Why 
did this prove to be the defining point 
of the new Islamic Republic’s foreign 
policy, particularly with regards to the 
United States? The reasons are similar 
to those that have justified the re-nor-
malization of Iranian relations with its 
two colonial tormenters in the face of 
continued silence between the US and 
Iran. Britain, which Ayatollah Khomei-
ni, who was Iran’s supreme leader from 
1979 to 1989, periodically referred to 
as the “Little Satan,” re-established dip-
lomatic relations with Iran in 1988.25 
The British embassy in Tehran, which 
was stormed and ransacked by pro-
testers in 2011, re-opened a relatively 
short four years later in August 2015.26 
Although Ayatollah Khomeini often 
also called the Soviet Union the “Lesser 
Satan,” the USSR was the first country 
to recognize the Islamic Republic, and 
Russia has continually maintained an 
embassy in Tehran since the 1979 rev-
olution.27
For many American citizens and 
politicians, the 444-day-long hostage 
crisis still has an “emotional legacy” of 
“humiliating trauma” and “nihilistic 
hatred,” and is often cited as one of the 
foremost reasons for continuing, unre-
lenting, and almost paranoid hostility 
toward Iran and proposals for its rein-
tegration into the international com-
munity.28 2013’s Academy Award for 
Best Picture Argo, while offering itself 
as “based off a true story,” holds true 
for the most part to Americans’ post-
1979 stereotype of Iranians as “ugly, 
poor, strictly religious, fanatical, and 
ignorant.”29 Former Republican presi-
dential candidate Scott Walker averred 
at his campaign kickoff speech in July 
2015—over thirty-four years after the 
return of the hostages—that “Iran 
hasn’t changed much since [Ameri-
can hostage Kevin Hermening] and 
the other hostages were released on 
President Reagan’s first day in office.”30 
Others, like former Pennsylvania sen-
ator Rick Santorum, claim that Iran 
represents “an apocalyptic version” of 
radical Islam “which is a death cult.”31
The frequency with which politi-
cians in the United States oversimplify 
or misrepresent Iran’s social and polit-
ical situation is almost on a level with 
Ayatollah Khamenei’s pronounce-
ments of “Death to America”—and is 
not helpful to a rational American for-
eign policy with regards to Iran. One 
of the most fascinating personal histo-
ries of Iran’s Islamic Republic is that of 
Masoumeh Ebtekar, President Hassan 
Rouhani’s vice president for environ-
mental protection and student spokes-
man of notoriety in the American em-
bassy hostage crisis. The position of 
“vice president” in the Iranian govern-
ment is roughly equivalent to that of a 
cabinet minister in the United States. 
Ebtekar, who spent six years of her 
childhood living in a Philadelphia sub-
urb gaining an almost perfect Ameri-
can English accent, rose to prominence 
under the name of “Mary” during the 
hostage crisis as anything but a like-
able figure in the eyes of the American 
public.32 Her experience with life in the 
United States seemingly made her de-
cision to be the official spokesperson 
for the complete rejection of American 
values advocated by many elements of 
the revolution that much more point-
ed. In Rouhani’s Iran, however, she 
has become something of a reformist, 
advocating for a “positive” Iranian in-
fluence “to bring stability to [the] trou-
bled region,” environmental NGOs 
in Tehran and freedom of expression 
that allow the “people into the process 
of governance,” and the need for “not 
oppressing your people,” in regards to 
Iran’s Syrian ally Bashar al-Assad.33
Ebtekar’s personal history, opin-
ions, and position in Iranian politics 
might suggest to some skeptical Amer-
icans that “crime does pay.”34 Some feel 
that seeing her rewarded with a posi-
tion of power can only mean that the 
underlying organization and ideals of 
revolutionary Iran remain unchanged. 
After all, in many imaginations she re-
mains an Iranian revolutionary “who, 
thirty-three years ago, helped steal 444 
days out of the lives of fifty-two inno-
cent Americans.”35 On the other hand, 
it’s intriguing to look at Ebtekar’s situ-
ation as symptomatic of a much larg-
er trend. In the context of what wide-
ly-admired Harvard historian Crane 
Brinton theorized as “the anatomy of 
revolution,” the stages of the former 
firebrand’s life fall almost precisely in 
place with a revolution’s stages of life.36 
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The “fever” of fervor that was Brinton’s 
metaphor for the normal progression 
of revolutionary movements consisted 
of three stages: the instigating “raging 
delirium” of the revolutionaries, then 
the “long, fitful convalescence, often 
under dictatorial rule” as the fever 
lessens, and finally “a return to nor-
malcy.”37 In Brinton’s cases studies, this 
translated to the Restoration of the En-
glish monarchy after Oliver Cromwell’s 
rule, the return of the Bourbon dynasty 
to power in France after Napoleon’s de-
feat at Waterloo, and Russia’s return to 
a repressive autocracy under Stalin.
The frenzy of a nation that en-
thralled Ebtekar in 1979 to act as 
spokesperson for a rash and impulsive 
attack on the United States’ embassy 
is hard to mistake; a more interesting 
and difficult question concerns Iran’s 
continued wallowing in the dictatorial 
fever of Brinton’s intermediate stage. 
Doubtless, there has very much been a 
return to a degree of pre-revolutionary 
“normalcy” in Iran, at least in terms of 
the Islamic Republic’s revival and in-
tensification of the Shah’s atrocious hu-
man rights records.38 Particularly in its 
relations with the West and the United 
States, however, Iran has stagnated in 
the second phase of revolution. A strict 
Islamic public and social morality con-
tinues to be much more stringently 
enforced than under the Pahlavi Shahs 
— who, in fact, outlawed the veil for 
Muslim women and actively promot-
ed relatively lax Western standards of 
dress and public conduct.39 The “mad 
religious energy” of 1979 and the first 
stage of revolution is clearly still a force 
in revolutionary Iranian society, albeit 
an established, institutionalized force.40 
What’s even more surprising is the 
apparently continuing ability of Iran’s 
ruling “seminary-trained clerics” to 
administer a semi-modern state with 
tens of millions of citizens and “deal 
with the problems of the twentieth 
century.”41 Regardless of their partial 
delegation of powers, it’s difficult to see 
how Iran’s ruling Shi’a clerics “steeped 
in esoteric medieval writings” — in-
cluding the Supreme Leader — could 
possibly possess the competence to 
tackle modern statecraft. 42
The answer to the riddle of the 
mullahs’ apparently miraculous ability 
to govern lies in the key alliance forged 
prior to the revolution between Isla-
mism and populism. The support of 
liberal, pro-democratic, anti-imperi-
alist students in Tehran certainly aid-
ed Khomeini in his rise to power; the 
support of Iran’s rural poor, however, 
was indispensable to the foundation 
of his theocracy.43 The Islamic Repub-
lic’s ability to provide for the common 
people — and the association of Isla-
mism in public opinion with the fight 
for “equality and social justice”— has 
been instrumental in its popular sup-
port. What’s more, for most of Iran’s 
post-1979 history, the people have had 
good reason to make this association. 
Among other moves, the theocracy re-
duced the Shah’s military spending by 
over seventy-five percent, re-routing 
these funds instead to social programs, 
reduced overall illiteracy in the country 
by thirty-eight percent (among women 
by forty-five percent), and lowered in-
fant mortality from 104 to twenty-five 
per 1,000.44
Despite the progress, Iran’s econ-
omy has, for the most part, remained 
wholly reliant on a single industry, 
leaving the popularity of the current 
regime vulnerable to the caprices of 
the world oil market—a weakness ex-
ploited by the joint US-EU econom-
ic sanction on the country targeting 
oil sales. As of 2012, oil continues to 
account for about eighty percent of 
Iran’s public revenue, even though the 
Islamic Republic has rarely produced 
more than half what the last Shah did 
with Western aid.45 46 The revolution-
ary Islamic government’s inability to 
diversify economically has restrained 
economic growth and frustrated the 
country’s burgeoning and increasing-
ly unemployed youth population: of 
the approximately one million new 
jobs needed annually to absorb Ira-
nian youth entering the labor mar-
ket, the current regime only produces 
about 300,000.47 Iran’s self-propelled, 
oil-dependent economy can only last 
so long, and a government in Tehran 
that either cannot or simply refuses 
to interact with the United States in 
particular and the West in general can 
never provide the Iranian people with 
long-term prosperity.
Granted that the Western strategy 
of sanctions has detected and struck 
at one of the Islamic Republic’s vital 
supports for continued control of Iran, 
why should the West be considering a 
deal at all? The stated goals of Western 
leaders going into negotiations with the 
Iranians are to prevent Iran from ob-
taining a nuclear weapon, but bringing 
an end to the mullahs’ regime would 
certainly accomplish that goal. Put-
ting aside the technical and economic 
difficulties of continuing sanctions, 
deal or no deal, the overly aggressive 
approach touted by some of the Iran 
deal’s enemies in the United States 
runs the probable risk of inadvertently 
strengthening another of the supports 
for Iran’s institutional revolutionaries 
— anti-Americanism.
Much support for the Iranian the-
ocracy among its proudly patriotic cit-
izens comes from a feeling — which 
very often seems justifiable — of for-
eign menaces to Iranian sovereignty 
surrounding the country. The over-
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riding motivation behind the Iranian 
students’ November 1979 storming of 
the American embassy in Tehran was 
President Carter’s decision to allow the 
deposed Shah into the United States 
for medical treatment—and the con-
current fear among Iranians that the 
US would attempt to reinstall him on 
the throne.48 Iran’s official attachment 
to furthering its defensive capabilities 
is founded, according to Ebtekar, in 
the presence of “dozens of American 
military bases in the area.”49 Even Mir 
Hossein Mousavi, leader of the Iranian 
Green Movement and 2009 reformist 
foil to arch-conservative former Pres-
ident Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, 
has definitively indicated that 
“he would not budge on Iran’s 
right to pursue nuclear pow-
er.”50
In the modern era, the con-
certed and sustained hostilities 
of established foreign powers 
against youthful revolutionary 
movements have generally re-
sulted less in the disintegration 
than the unification of those 
movements, as they are able to 
claim a degree of legitimacy as defend-
ers of the nation. This was notably the 
case in France in the aftermath of the 
French Revolution. The War of the First 
Coalition, from 1792 to 1797, saw vir-
tually every monarchy of consequence 
in Western Europe declare war on the 
nascent French democracy. Instead, 
however, of delivering a bloody end 
to French revolutionaries, the conflict 
instead legitimized the revolutionary 
regime as the protector of the nation.
Although it would be difficult and 
most likely inaccurate to make moral 
equivalents of the French revolution-
aries in 1789 and their Iranian coun-
terparts in 1979, the effect of foreign 
campaigns against each movement 
produced remarkably similar results. 
The Iran-Iraq War, which lasted from 
1980 to 1988, saw Iraqi President 
Saddam Hussein receive significant co-
vert and intelligence support from the 
United States, as well as the logistical 
support of France, Germany, Britain, 
and Portugal.51 Extensive aid from the 
West and the Arab Gulf States contin-
ued to come in the face of Iraq’s open 
and “repeated use of nerve agents and 
toxic gases,” as well as mustard gas, in 
defiance of the 1925 Geneva Accords 
banning such weapons.52 As of 2014, 
it was estimated that around 70,000 
Iranians, both veterans and civilians, 
were currently in the process of dying 
from their exposure to Iraqi chemical 
weapons, and that total casualties re-
lated to the illegal arms may eventual-
ly rival the number killed by chemical 
weapons on both sides in World War 
I.53 The effect of Western indifference 
and almost unanimous support to 
Hussein’s Iraq and its usage of “weap-
ons banned…by international norms” 
was just as toxic on Iranian foreign pol-
icy as the weapons themselves, boxing 
Iran and its revolutionary regime into 
the “strategic loneliness” of a pariah 
state that it retains for the most part to 
the present day.54 Indeed, documenta-
tion proves that the Reagan Admin-
istration was fully aware that “it was 
selling materials to Iraq…being used 
for the manufacture of chemical weap-
ons,” again in violation of international 
law and norms.55
Interestingly, although Iran may or 
may not have had the capacity to pro-
duce chemical weapons in response to 
Iraq during the war, a fatwa from Aya-
tollah Khomeini specifically forbade 
their production or usage.56 During 
the 2015 struggle in Congress over 
the Iranian nuclear accords, former 
President Obama also suggested that 
the current Ayatollah Khamenei had 
issued a fatwa against the production 
of nuclear weapons as well.57 In any 
event, regardless of the accuracy 
or the sincerity of these prohi-
bitions, it remains the case that 
a nation ostracized politically 
and economically for as long 
as Iran constitutes a free-for-all 
for hardliners and ultra-con-
servatives to gain and retain 
power. The status quo of the 
Islamic Republic’s political and 
cultural dominance inside Iran 
doesn’t coincidentally mirror 
the nearly uniform exclusion 
of Iran from many important interna-
tional communities and efforts. The 
importance of Iranian conflict with the 
United States to the continued power 
of the theocracy is convincingly indi-
cated by Ayatollah Khamenei’s post-
deal exhortations to the Iranian people 
to “prepare for the continuation of the 
fight against America,” in spite of feel-
ings among Iranian moderates that 
“our Great Satan without sanctions is 
just not the same anymore.”58
Given the repeated threats from 
the current presidential administration 
to unilaterally renege on the deal and 
re-impose sanctions, it’s hardly difficult 
to realize that the already poor rela-
tionship of mistrust between the Unit-
[S]ustained hostilities of estab-
lished foreign powers against 
youthful revolutionary move-
ments have generally resulted 
less in the disintegration than the 
unification of those movements...
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ed States and Iran is being destructively 
deteriorated further. It doesn’t help to 
“negotiate from a position of strength,” 
as former Louisiana Governor Bobby 
Jindal suggested in an interview for 
Iowa Public Radio in 2015, if the Ira-
nian regime doesn’t believe that the 
United States is being genuine in any of 
its demands or concessions.59 This isn’t 
to say that Iran should be welcomed 
back into the ring of nations uncon-
ditionally or spontaneously. However, 
to suggest that the terms of the Iran 
deal negotiated by former President 
Obama’s State Department does this is 
simply a misrepresentation of reality. 
What’s more, many opponents of the 
deal — including many in President 
Trump’s administration — ignore that 
the historical context and motivation 
of Iran’s current regime and nuclear 
program are reactions to the very same 
over-aggressive foreign policy that they 
preach. The long history of forceful 
abuse at the hands of Western powers 
that informs Iran’s perception of the 
West certainly doesn’t bode well for the 
success of a “better” deal with Iran that 
would overemphasize force.
Whether or not President Trump 
directs his administration to cancel 
former President Obama’s landmark 
leap forward with Iran and with deal-
ing with the country’s nuclear program 
is, of course, still uncertain. Important 
to recognize is that the 2015 deal was 
not negotiated solely between the Unit-
ed States and Iran — Britain, France, 
and Germany all have stakes in sus-
taining cooperation between the West 
and the Islamic Republic as well. These 
three countries also have redeveloped 
significant business ties with Tehran 
in the few years since trade reopened, 
suggesting that cooler heads in Europe 
might be keener to keep the United 
States in line and in compliance with 
its end of the nuclear deal.60
A disproportional number of the 
Iran deal’s opponents in the United 
States seem to be under the impression 
that Iran didn’t exist before 1979, and 
that Iranian society has been cryogen-
ically preserved ever since the Revo-
lution. Foremost on their Iran agenda 
isn’t so much the resolution of ten-
sions with the Islamic Republic as its 
punishment and humiliation for the 
hostage crisis. A contextual approach 
to Iran’s nuclear program is absolutely 
necessary to constructive and success-
ful diplomatic policy in the areas of 
disarmament and anti-proliferation. 
The State Department under the direc-
tion of former Secretary of State Kerry 
and former President Obama seemed 
to recognize this reality — Obama 
couched his reasonable statement that 
“Iran is not going to simply dismantle 
its program because we demand it to 
do so,” with the explanation that “that’s 
not how the world works, and that’s 
not what history shows us.”61 The deal’s 
opponents fail to learn from the history 
and the root causes of our unfriendly 
relationship with Iran, and tensions 
will only worsen if the resentment and 
fear-mongering of one-dimensional 
anti-deal sentiment succeeds in con-
tinuing to control American policy to-
ward Iran.
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